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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
THE WISCONSIN INHERITANCE TAX ON TRANSFERS
INTENDED TO TAKE EFFECT IN POSSESSION OR
ENJOYMENT AT OR AFTER DEATH
I. INTRODUCTION
The courts and legislatures have not been too successful in their
attempts to dispel the somewhat common but erroneous impression
that a state inheritance tax is imposed only on transfers by will or
the intestate laws.1 The contention is frequently raised on appeals
from the imposition of the tax that it does not apply where the trans-
feree takes by virtue of a contract or other inter vivos arrangement.2
The constitutionality of the extension of the inheritance tax into the
area of inter vivos transfers was decided at an early date. Historically,
the possibility that inter vivos transfers might be used as a device
to avoid an inheritance tax restricted only to transfers by will or under
the intestate laws was first recognized by the Pennsylvania legislature
in 1826.4 As a stopgap measure to prevent such tax avoidance, a
clause was incorporated into the Inheritance Tax Act specifying that
"transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after the death of the transferor" were subject to the inheritance tax.
This general provision was adopted in Wisconsin in 18995 and again in
1903,6 when the legislature borrowed its statute practically verbatim
from New York. Since the enactment in 1933 of the Wisconsin Gift
Tax Act,7 the question is not one of tax avoidance but whether the
IFor example, Sec. 72.01(1) and (2) of the WISCONSIN STATUTES tax only
transfers by will or intestate laws but Sec. 72.01(3) (a) taxes inter vivos gifts
in contemplation of death and Sec. 72.0-(3) (b) taxes inter vivos transfers in-
tended to take effect at death. The earliest judicial comment is found in State
v. Pabst, 139 Wis. 561, 121 N.W. 352 (1909) : "The statute was not intended to
restrict persons in their right to transfer property in all legitimate ways, but it
clearly manifests a purpose to tax all transfers which are accomplished by will,
the intestate laws and those made prior to death which can be classed as similar
in nature and effect, because they accomplish a transfer of property under cir-
cumstances which impress on it characteristics of a devolution made at the
time of the donor's death." (emphasis added) See also Will of Allis, 174 Wis.
527, 534, 184 N.W. 381, 383 (1921).
2 This contention was sustained by the majority opinion in Estate of Sweet, 270
Wis. 256, 70 N.W.2d 646 (1955). See discussion by Justice Currie in his dis-
senting opinion. Contention was rejected in Estate of Brackett, 342 Mich. 195,
69 N.W.2d 164 (1955).
3 Keeney v. New York, 222 U.S. 525, 32 S.Ct. 105, 56 L.Ed. 299 (1912).
4 Leighton, Origin of Phrase, 'Intended to Take Effect in Possession or Enjoy-
inent At or After... Death', 56 YALE L. J. 176 (1946).
5 Chapter 355 of the Laws of 1899, subsection 3 of section 1. The language of
the Wisconsin provision was modeled after the corresponding section of the
New York Laws of 1892, Chapter 399, with amendments to 1895. It differed
from the New York law in that it was limited to transfers of personal property
in excess of ten thousand dollars. In 1902 the Wisconsin Supreme Court in its
decision of Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205, 89 N.W. (1902) declared Chapter 355,
as amended by chapter 245 of the Laws of 1901, unconstitutional.
6 Chapter 44 of the Laws of 1903 was passed to remedy the constitutional defect
by making the inheritance tax applicable to all classifications of property.
7 Chapter 363 of the Laws of 1933, Wis. STATS. (1955), §72.75 et al.
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inter vivos transfer is subject to either a gift tax or an inheritance
tax. In view of the fact that Sec. 72.75(4)8 provides that no gift tax
will be imposed upon the transfer of any property which is taxable
under the inheritance tax law of this state, inter vivos transfers falling
within the scope of the "transfer intended"9 provision, or within Sec.
72.01(3) (a) as a gift in contemplation of death, would not be subject
to the gift tax.
The scope of Sec. 72.01(3) (b) taxing transfers intended to take
effect at death is limited to transfers which are partially or wholly
donative. There is some evidence in the Wisconsin decisions that it
is not the purpose of this provision to subject to the inheritance tax
strictly "arm's length" transactions.'0 Prior to the 1949 amendment 1
this limitation was imposed by judicial decision 12 but now Sec. 72.01
(3) (a) and (b) expressly exclude transfers for "an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth." Under Sec. 72.76(1)
a transfer, sale or exchange for less than "an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth" is deemed a gift for gift tax
purposes to the extent the clear market value exceeds the consideration
received. The money equivalent limitation does not distinguish the
transfer intended to take effect at death from a gift in contemplation
of death or an inter vivos gift under Sec. 72.75. However, it is im-
portant to note that the gift tax is imposed on the excess of the clear
market value over the consideration received while the inheritance tax
appears to be measured by the entire clear market value of the
property without an allowance for any consideration received.' 3
What primarily distinguishes the transfer intended to take effect
at death from a gift in contemplation of death or a gift for gift tax
purposes is that it is incomplete at the time it is made and that the
death of the transferor is a factor in completing the devolution of the
property to the transferee. Under Sec. 72.01(3) (a) the subjective
element that the gift be motivated by an expectation of death is a
8 All section citations in the text of this paper refer to the WiscoNsIN STATUTES
(1955).
9 For the purpose of convenience the phrase, "transfer intended," shall be used
as an abbreviation of "transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoy-
ment at or after the death of the grantor."
10 Estate of Miller, 239 Wis. 551, 554, 2 N.W.2d 256 (1942) : "The character of
the transaction excludes the possibility of the existence of a commercial deal-
ing or of an exchange in which a valuable and adequate consideration, as that
which is used in testing a transaction of this nature, has passed so as to bar the
levying of the tax."
I" Chapter 172 of the laws of 1949.
12 Will of Koeffler, 218 Wis. 560, 260 N.W. 638 (1935).
13 WIs. STATS. (1955) §72.01(8) imposes the inheritance tax on the fair market
value of the property and only upon the excess of the exemptions. Unlike the
gift tax provision, this section makes no express allowance for any partial
consideration that may have passed to the transferor.
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prerequisite,'1 4 and this motivation is presumed to exist if the transferor
dies within two years after the date of the transfer.13 Such an intent
is not required under the "transfer intended" clause.16 An inter vivos
transfer to be subject to a gift tax must be complete in the sense that
the transferor has retained no beneficial interest in the property or any
power to revest such interest in himself.' A completed inter vivos
gift may be subject to an inheritance tax only if it is made in con-
templation of death.' 8
The distinction between these three types of inter vivos transfers
is best illustrated by a consideration of three different fact situations.
The first situation is where A makes an absolute transfer of property
to B without receiving any consideration. The transfer is complete
for gift tax purposes if the transferor retains no beneficial interest or
any power to revest such interest in himself. It does not come under
the "transfer intended" clause because death is not a factor in com-
pleting the devolution of the property. If A dies within two years of
the date of the transfer and if the presumption that the transfer was
in contemplation of death is not overcome, B must pay an inheritance
tax on the clear market value of the property at the time of death and
B is given a credit for the amount of the gift tax paid.19 In the second
situation A transfers the fee in the property to B without receiving
any consideration but subject to a reservation of the beneficial interest
for his lifetime. The transfer is not complete for gift tax purposes
under Sec. 72.76(7) because the transferor has not divested himself of
all the beneficial interest in the property, assuming that the property
14 State v. Pabst, 139 Wis. 561, 121 N.W. 352 (1909). Will of Daniels, 225 Wis.
502, 274 N.W. 435 (1937).
15 Wis. STATS. (1955) §72 01(3) (a).
16 Estate of Schranck, 202 Wis. 107, 230 N.W. 691 (1930).
17 WIS. STAT. (1955) §72.76(7) : "A gift shall be complete for tax purposes when
the donor has divested himself of all beneficial interest in the property trans-
ferred and has no power to revest any such interest in himself or his estate."
This section apparently complements Sec. 72.01(3) (b), the "transfer intended"
provision, which attempts to define what type of beneficial interest and what
powers retained will subject the intervivos transfer to an inheritance tax at the
death of the transferor, or in other words, specifies the criteria for an in-
complete intervivos transfer subject to the inheritance tax.
18 A gift complete for tax purposes within the meaning of Sec. 72.76 (7) may come
under Sec. 72.01(3) (b). Where the donor does not divest himself of the
power to designate the beneficiaries or any other power other than the power
to revest the beneficial interest in himself or his estate, the gift would be com-
plete for gift tax purposes, providing the retention of the power might not be
considered, in effect, as the retention of the beneficial interest in the property.
Despite the completeness of the transfer under Sec. 72.76(7), if the retained
power comes under Sec. 72.01(3) (b), it is subject to an inheritance tax by
virtue of Sec. 72.75(4). If the retained power does not come under Sec.
72.01(3) (b), it may still be taxed as a transfer in contemplation of death if it
satisfies Sec. 72.01(3) (a). It appears that a transfer may be complete for gift
tax purposes but incomplete for purposes of inheritance taxation under the
"transfer intended" clause.
19 WIs. STAT. (1955) §72.75(4).
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is considered a single indivisible unit.20 Even if A dies within two
years after the date of such a transfer, the incompleteness of the
transfer should not prevent it from being taxed as a transfer in con-
templation of death.21 But since the death of the transferor is necessary
to complete the devolution of the property, it is taxable under the
"transfer intended" clause. In the third situation A transfers abso-
lutely without receiving any consideration the beneficial interest in the
property to B for a period measured by A's life, and then, at the death
of A the remainder in fee is to go to C. It is assumed that B is not
closely related to A, because if such a relationship existed, a court
might readily find-that A in effect reserved the beneficial interest in
the property for his lifetime.22 In view of the fact that the "transfer
intended" clause requires either a reservation of a beneficial interest
in the property or the retention of some power of control and that the
gift tax provision requires a divestment of all the beneficial interest in
the property and the divestment of any power to revest such interest,
it appears that the legislature intended that the completeness of the
transfer be the dividing line between transfers intended to take effect
at death and transfers subject to a gift tax.23 Once the transfer
is complete in the lifetime of the transferor, his death is no longer a
factor necessary to complete the devolution of the property from
him. 23a The transfer to both B and C would, therefore, be subject to
a gift tax.
By way of a brief summary, it can be stated that an inter vivos
transfer, in trust or otherwise, will be subject to an inheritance tax
at the death of the transferor under Sec. 72.01(3) (b) if the transfer
is partially or entirely donative and if the transfer is incomplete in
that the transferor has retained the beneficial interest in the property
for his lifetime or some requisite power of control, which makes his
death a factor in completing the devolution of the property from him
to another.
20 It is assumed that the property is one indivisible unit because if the property
consisted of severable units, it would be possible to have a gift complete for
gift tax purposes under Sec. 72.76(7) of the severable units equal to the
.difference between the total number of units and the units representing the
beneficial interest retained by the transferor.21-A transfer is deemed in contemplation of death within the meaning of Sec.
72.01(3) (a) if it is (1) by deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift, (2) made
within 2 years prior to the death of the grantor, vendor or donor, of a ma-
terial part of his estate, or in the nature of a final disposition or distribution
thereof, and (3) without an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth. Apparently, whether the transfer is complete within the mean-
ing of Sec. 72.76(7) or Sec. 72.01(3) (b) is immaterial so long as the require-
ments of a transfer in contemplation are satisfied and the presumption is not
rebutted.
22 People v. Moses, 363 Ill. 423, 2 N.E.2d 724 (1936), In re Brockett's Estate, 111
N.J. Eq. 183, 162 Atl. 150 (1932).
23 Supra, note 18. A transfer is complete when the requirements of Sec. 72.76(7)
and Sec. 72.01(3) (b) are met.23a See, however, footnote 80 infra.
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It is the purpose of this paper to review the Wisconsin decisions
in the light of the present statutory provision and other pertinent state
court decisions in order to earmark the types of inter vivos transfers
that may be taxed under the "transfer intended" clause.
II. INTER Vivos TRANSFERS WHERE THE TRANSFEROR RETAINED A
BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY FOR His LIFETIME
The Wisconsin court in its early decisions involving the "transfer
intended" clause took the position that the retention by the transferor
of the beneficial interest and the retention of a certain degree of control
were two basic factors in determining the taxability of donative trans-
fers under the clause. 24 The distinction between the retention of a
beneficial interest and the degree of control was given additional
emphasis in the 1949 legislative interpretation of the clause.2 5 Sec.
72.01(3) (b) now expressly includes within the purview of the clause
"any transfer where the transferor has retained for his life or for any
period not ending before his death: 1) the possession or enjoyment
of, or the right to the income, or to economic benefit from, the property,
or 2) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person, to alter,
amend, revoke or terminate such transfer, or to designate the bene-
ficiary who shall possess or enjoy the property, or the income, or
economic benefit therefrom."
This distinction serves as a logical starting point in the analysis of
the various cases. Thus, if the transferor retains no right of control
over the property but retains the beneficial interest, the transfer is
intended to take effect when the shifting of the beneficial interest
occurs. Here the timing of the transfer becomes a crucial factor. In
view of the express language of Sec. 72.01(3)(b) specifying "any
period not ending before his death," whether a transfer involving a
retention of the beneficial interest for a definite period of time comes
within the clause depends on when the actual shift occurs. If it occurs
at or after the death of the transferor, it is caught under the clause. If
it occurs during the lifetime of the transferor, it is not within reach of
the caluse. However it may still be taxed as a gift in contemplation of
death2 6 or subjected to a gift tax.2 7 The mere fact that the transfer
creates a vested remainder during the lifetime of the transferor does
not exclude it from the operation of the clause if there is a shifting
of the beneficial interest at or after the death of the transferor.2 8
24 Estate of Prang, 201 Wis. 636, 639, 231 N.W. 271 (1930) : "The test to be
applied is whether donor reserved to himself any beneficial or economic in-
terest, or any right thereafter to otherwise dispose such interest in the corpus
of the trust for the benefit of himself or otherwise." This test was applied in
Estate of Waite, 208 Wis. 307, 242 N.W. 173 (1932).
25 Supra, note 11.
2r WIS. STATS. (1955) §72.01(3) (a).
27 WIs. STATS. (1955) §72.75.
28 Estate of Waite, 208 Wis. 307, 309, 242 N.W. 173, 174 (1932).
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A. THE TRANSFER RETAINS THE POSSESSION AIND ENJOYMENT OF THE
PROPERTY FOR His LIFETIME
1. Reservation of a Legal Life Estate. The courts generally
agree that where a transferor during his lifetime transfers by deed
the remainder in fee and reserves to himself a life estate in the prop-
erty, the remainderman will be subjected to an inheritance tax upon
the death of the transferor under the "transfer intended" clause.
29
The law on this point was well settled when Wisconsin adopted its
Inheritance Tax Act.30 When a case involving a reservation of a legal
life estate came up to the Suprem Court in 1930 for decision, this
point was not even considered. 31 The decedent in this case, approxi-
mately twelve years before his death and immediately before his
second marriage, deeded the fee in all of his real estate to his three
sons, subject to a reservation of a life estate in himself. The transfer
was admitted to be in contemplation of marriage to prevent a second
wife from acquiring dower rights in the property. The three remainder-
men contended on appeal (1) that the "transfer intended" clause re-
quired an intention motivated by an expectation of death and (2) that
if the transfer were subject to an inheritance tax, the tax should be
imposed only on the value of the life estate at the time of the transfer
in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 72.15(7), which restricts
the tax to the increase of benefit to the remaindermen upon the termi-
nation of the life estate. The court ruled that it is not necessary that
a transfer be motivated by considerations of death in order to be
taxable under the "transfer intended" clause and that Sec. 72.15(7)
is applicable only to a life estate based upon the life of some person
other than the transferor. By virtue of Sec. 72.01(8) the remainder-
men are taxed on the clear market value of the entire fee.
2. A Reciprocal Trust. An arrangement that closely parallels
the reserved life estate situation is one type of the reciprocal trust.
In this type of trust two settlors, usually close relatives, transfer legal
title of property to a trustee in trust for themselves as beneficiaries.
32
There is no immediate and present transfer of a beneficial interest to
anyone else. Under the terms of the trust agreement the survivor
takes the entire beneficial interest in the corpus of the trust created by
the first to die. In effect, each settlor retains the bneficial interest in
his own property for his lifetime, and the beneficial interest in one
trust shifts when the first settlor dies.
A comparable arrangement was involved in the Estate of Miller3 3
In this case two sisters, owners of equal undivided interests in real
29 See 139, 167 A.L.R. 1056, 443 (1947).
30 Matter of Brandreth, 169 N.Y. 437, 62 N.E. 563 (1902).
31 Estate of Schranck, 202 Wis. 107, 230 N.W. 691 (1930).
32 In re Perry's Estate, 111 N.J. Eq. 176, 162 AtI. 146 (1932).
33 Estate of Miller, 239 Wis. 551, 2 N.W.2d 256 (1942).
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estate sold it, taking in payment a note secured by a trust mortgage.
The note provided that each sister was to receive her proportionate
share of the interest payments and that the principal payable to the
trustee was to be paid to the survivor on the death of the other sister.
The Wisconsin court did not hesitate to look behind the form of the
arrangement to find that the transaction came within the "transfer
intended" clause, being essentially a situation where the transferor
reserves a life estate.
3. Transferor Delivers Deed Absolute on its Face But Retains
Possession and Enjoyment of the Property by an Extrinsic Agree-
ment. Analogous to an express reservation of a legal life estate
is the arrangement where the transferor executes a deed absolute on
its face but by virtue of an extrinsic agreement actually retains the
possession and beneficial use of the property. If the form of the
transaction is ignored, the transferor has in fact reserved for himself
a life interest in the property. This type of an arrangement was in-
volved in the Estate of Odgen.34 Approximately three years and eight
months before his death, the decedent deeded to his daughter by war-
ranty deed certain real estate. It was understood between the father
and the daughter that the father would retain the benefit of all the
income from the property and pay all the operating expenses during
his lifetime. The Wisconsin court found that the parol evidence rule
was no obstacle to the admissibility of any oral or written extrinsic
evidence to prove that the transferor had in fact retained the pos-
session and enjoyment of the property and ruled that the arrangement
was taxable under the "transfer intended" clause because the trans-
feror had retained the beneficial interest in the property and the
benefits did not actually shift until his death. The court, after having
looked behind the form of this patent attempt at tax avoidance, sug-
gests that "in order to escape the tax in this state the transfer must
pass property from the transferor with all the attributes of ownership
independently of his death."35
How a transferor may intentionally attempt to conceal a retained
beneficial interest is illustrated in numerous decisions in other states
interpreting the "transfer intended" clause. 36 The shape and form of
the device is limited only by the ingenuity of the transferor. A com-
mon device employed is to camouflage the inter vivos transfer by the
use of two separate instruments, both of which appear to be complete
on their face. However, when the two instruments are considered
34 Estate of Ogden, 209 Wis. 162, 244 N.W. 571 (1932).
3 This decision antedates the Gift Tax Act. Currently, the problem is not one of
escaping taxation but whether the transfer is subject to either a gift tax or an
inheritance tax.36 Rottschaefer, Taxation of Transfers Intended to Take Effect in Possession or
Enjoyment at Grantor's Death, 26 IowA L. REv. 514 (1941).
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together, their combined effect is to give the transferor a beneficial
interest for his lifetime. A typical example of such an arragement is
an absolute deed of conveyance fully executed and delivered to the
beneficiaries but combined with a lease back to the grantor for a nominal
consideration 37 or a bond38 or other agreement which in effect gives
the grantor the economic benefits from the property.39 Other examples
involve transfers to a straw man who transfers to a trustee to pay a
fixed income to the original grantor for life40 or an absolute transfer
in trust subject to the settlor's present and future liabilities.41 These
cases indicate a general willingness on the part of the courts to look
behind the literal provisions of an agreement and to emphasize the
substance rather than the form of the agreement.
4. U.S. Government Savings Bonds. The acquisition of U.S.
Government Savings Bonds poses a problem under the "transfer in-
tended" clause which in recent years various state courts have at-
tempted to solve with somewhat conflicting results.42 In the majority
of bond purchases it is the actual purchaser who advances the entire
consideration and becomes the registered owner with the right to
designate another party as a co-owner or the person to whom the
bond will be payable on the purchaser's death. As a general rule, the
registered owner, having paid for the bond, retains possession of the
bond and under the Federal Regulations has the right to cash the bond
in at any time during his life without consent of the co-owner or other
beneficiary.43 In effect, the registered owner retains the beneficial
interest in the bond for his lifetime and on his death the beneficial
interest shifts to another.
To maintain a position consistent with these general principles
some courts have held that where the decedent-purchaser of the bonds
retains possession of them until his death, the transfer of his right
to the payment is taxed under the "transfer intended" clause. 44 Where
the purchaser survives the co-owner or other beneficiary, the transfer
37Moor v. Bugbee, 3 N.J. Misc. 435, 128 AtI. 679 (1925), affirmed in 102 N.J.L.
720, 135 Ati. 919 (1927).
3 In re Cornell's Estate, 170 N.Y. 423, 63 N.E. 445 (1902).
39 Brandreth's Estate, 169 N.Y. 437, 62 N.E. 563 (1902).
40 In re Miller's Estate, 236 N.Y. 290, 140 N.E. 701 (1923).
41 In re Dubois's Appeal, 121 Pa. 268, 15 Atl. 641 (1888).
4239 A.L.R.2d 690 (1955).
43 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS, Title 31, §315.45 and 315.46.
44 Series E co-ownership bonds were held to be taxable under the "transfer
intended" clause: Rummel's Estate 74 S.D. 131, 49 N.W.2d 380 (1951), Brown's
Estate, 122 Mont. 451, 206 P.2d 816 (1949). The Montana Statute was
amended after this decision to subject one half of the value of the bond to the
tax instead of the entire value.
Series E payable-on-death bonds held to be taxable as a transfer intended to
take effect at death: Mitchell v. Carson, 186 Tenn. 228, 209 S.W.2d 20 (1948).
The Michigan court refuses to tax either type of bond. See DeWater's Estate,
338 Mich. 457, 61 N.W2d 779 (1953).
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has been held not taxable.45 No beneficial interest shifts to the pur-
chaser at the death of the other party. Other courts have applied
statutes taxing jointly owned property to U.S. Government bonds.46
The Wisconsin court has not ruled upon the question of the tax-
ability of either type of bond. The bonds might be taxed under Sec.
72.01(6) as jointly owned property and a tax might be imposed on
one half of the value of the bond in the same manner that a joint bank
account is taxed. The analogy between the government bond and the
joint bank account is very tenuous. In the case of the latter, either
joint owner can sever the right of survivorship as to funds withdrawn.
The co-owners of government bonds have no comparable rights. The
purchaser of the bond is the absolute owner during his lifetime so long
as he retains dominion and control over the bond and if he cashes it in
during his lifetime, the co-owner is entitled to nothing. The analogy
completely breaks down when it is applied to the bond payable on death.
Taxing the government bonds as jointly held property also creates a
difficult tax enforcement problem where the purchaser of the bond
is the survivor. Generally, the purchaser retains possession of the
bonds, and when the other party dies, his personal representative has
no way of ascertaining the prior rights of the decedent. It cannot be
expected that the purchaser will volunteer any payment of the in-
heritance tax when he has the right to obtain payment of the bonds
during his lifetime and can exercise this right after the death of the
other party.
The more realistic approach to the problem is to view it as a
transfer intended to take effect at death. The purchaser by designating
a co-owner or other beneficiary on the face of the bond creates a right
in such person to obtain payment at or after the death of the purchaser.
Certainly, under the Federal Regulations the purchaser has retained
for his lifetime the beneficial interest in the bonds, that is, the right
to convert the bonds into cash. 47 Where the bond is made payable on
death to some designated beneficiary, the beneficiary interest retained
by the purchaser shifts to the beneficiary at the death of the purchaser.
Where the bond is made out in co-ownership form, the purchaser
retains the beneficial interest in the bonds so long as he retains domin-
ion and control over the bonds in as much as the Federal Regulations
allow the designated co-owner in possession of the bonds to obtain
payment without the consent of the purchasing co-owner.48 A sur-
render of dominion and control over the bonds to the designated co-
45 Heinlein's Estate, 30 ERIE Co. L. J. 27 (1947).
46 McGary's Estate, 355 Pa. 232, 49 A.2d 350 (1946). Hallett v. Bailey, 143 Me. 1,
54 A.2d 533 (1947).
47Supra, note 43.
4 Supra, note 43.
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owner constitutes a completed inter vivos gift.49 The retention of
possession of the bonds by the purchasing co-owner for his lifetime
causes the shift of the beneficial interest to occur at his death and,
therefore, comes within the reach of the "transfer intended" clause.50
In the event that the purchasing co-owner survives the designated co-
owner, the survivor is not taxed under the clause because the bene-
ficial interest does not shift at the death of the designated co-owner."'
5. Contracts Concerning Transfers of Business Interests at
Death. A transferor may retain the beneficial interest in property
for his lifetime and cause a shift in this beneficial interest to occur
at or after his death pursuant to the terms of a contract.52 Partnership
agreements and stock option agreements between the principal stock-
holders in a closely held corporation frequently provide for the transfer
to the survivors of the decedent's interest.-3
A contract involving a performance timed to occur at the death
of one of the parties should be distinguished from a contract to exe-
cute mutual provisions in a will. The latter type of contract was
involved in the Will of Jones where two principal corporate stock-
holders entered into a contract that each would provide in his will
that the other should have an option to purchase a specific number of
shares in the corporation at twenty-five percent below the appraised
value of the shares. 54 The benefit to a surviving stockholder under such
an agreement passes by virtue of the decedent's will and is taxed as a
transfer by will under Sec. 72.01(1).
Where the provision in a partnership agreement provides that
upon the death of a partner his share in the assets of the firm should
become the property of the survivor without any payment to his
estate, courts have held such a devolution of property taxable under
the "transfer intended" clause.55 The provisions in a partenership
agreement stipulating that for the purpose of evaluating a decedent's
partnership interest, the good will and partnership name shall have
zero valuations have likewise been caught under the clause.5 The view
that the analogous stock option agreements fall within the clause finds
support in both the state and federal decisions.5"
The Wisconsin attorney confronted with the problem of drafting
49Littlejohn v. County Judge, Pembina County, 58 N.W.2d. 278 (N. Dak., 1953).
50 Ibid.51
,Heinlein's Estate, 30 EiE Co. L. J. 27 (1947).
52 justice Black supported the view that such contracts create transfers intended
to take effect at death in Commissioner v. Church 335 U.S. 632, 69 S.Ct. 322,
93 L.Ed. 291 (1947).
5 Comment, Options and Sale Contracts in Taxation, 46 YALE L. J. 272.
54 Will of Jones, 206 Wis. 482, 240 N.W. 186 (1932).
55 Minoff v. Margetts, 14, N.J. Super. 30, 81 A.2d 369 (1951).
56 Deitz's Estate, 105 N.J. Eq. 671, 149 At]. 257 (1930). Halle's Estate, 103 Misc.
661, 170 N.Y. Supp. 898 (1918).
57 Supra, note 52. 157 A.L.R. 973 (1945).
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a buy and sell provision or a stock option agreement to provide con-
tinuity of management and control of the business in the event of the
death of a partner or principal stockholder should not lose sight of the
inheritance tax consequences. Under the rule of the Will of Jones
the agreement should not require the parties to execute provisions
in their wills to transfer their interest to the survivor upon death.
Even if a full and adequate consideration in money or money's worth
is paid to the estate, Sec. 72.01(1) does not exclude such transfers.
Transfers satisfying the money equivalent requirement are excluded
from taxation under the "transfer intended" clause.58 An agreement to
purchase at some fractional part of the appraised value, such as was
contained in the Will of Jones, fails to satisfy the money equivalent
requirement and is subject to the risk of being taxed on its entire clear
market value under the "transfer intended" clause. Likewise, pro-
visions assigning a zero evaluation to good will and the firm name
should be avoided. 59
B. THE TRANSFEROR RETAINS THE RIGHT TO THE INCOME OR
ECONOMIc BENEFIT FROM THE PROPERTY FOR His LIFETIME
It is well settled law that any inter vivos transfer under the terms
of which the transferor retains a right to the income from the prop-
erty is taxable under the "transfer intended" clause.60 Sec. 72.01(3)-
(b) expressly includes transfers where the transferor retains the right
to the income from the property for his life or for any period not
ending before his death. The type of fact situation now to be con-
sidered differs from those discussed in sub-part A in that the transferor
has divested himself of the possession of the property. It should be
noted that these particular classifications are not mutually exclusive.
Where a transferor parts with the bare legal title and retains pos-
session and the income from the property for his lifetime, a fact situa-
tion that overlaps both classifications is posed. Regardless of what the
particular classification may be, under the "rentention of beneficial
interest" test, it comes within the scope of the "transfer intended"
clause.
In the Estate of Waite6 ' the Wisconsin court was called upon to
decide whether an irrevocable trust agreement entered into by the
decedent approximately eleven years before his death was taxable
under the clause. The decedent transferred to a trustee shares of stock
in trust to pay to himself an annual income during his life and upon
58 WIS. STATS. (1955) §72.01(3) (b). [Estate of Banta, 273 Wis. 328, 77 N.W.2d
730 (1956) held the consideration must be adequate at time of transferor's
death and not merely at time agreement was made. Ed.]
59 Supra, note 56.60 85 C.J.S., TAXATION §1147(3) (d), see cases cited at page 939.
61208 Wis. 307, 242 N.W. 173 (1932).
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his death half of the corpus was to go to his son and the other half
was to be administered for the benefit of the grandchildren. The
principal contention of the beneficiaries on appeal was that the re-
mainder was vested at the time of the trust agreement and therefore
nothing passed from the transferor at the time of his death. The
court properly declined to apply the technical property concepts of
vesting and held the case to be within the iule set forth in the Will
of Prange62 that the retention of a beneficial interest or the right to
dispose of such interest in the corpus of the trust for the benefit of
himself or otherwise is a controlling factor in determining taxability
under the clause.
A long line of decisions in the state courts have held that an agree-
ment by the transferee to pay income to the transferor for life is not
taxable if the actual property transferred is not bound to produce the
money to be paid.63 The Wisconsin court joined the ranks in its deci-
sion of the Estate of Hamilton.6 4 The decedent in this case at the age
of sixty-four purchased from various religious societies bonds payable
to his order in fixed periodic payments for the duration of his life. It
was conceded that the purchase of the bonds was partly donative in
that the decedent could have purchased annuity policies for the same
amount of money from insurance companies and would have realized
a much higher return. The overpayment by the purchaser presented
the court with no problem because the court correctly held that there
was an absolute transfer at the time of the purchase. The excess of
the price paid over the clear market value of the annuity constitutes a
completed inter vivos gift. The transaction does not come within the
scope of the "transfer intended" clause because there is no shifting of
a beneficial interest in the property actually transferred at the death
of the transferor, the shift having occurred in his lifetime.
Transferring the right to the income or the power to determine
the amount of the income to a close relative of the transferor may not
place the transfer outside the scope of the clause if the court finds
that the transferor has actually retained the economic benefit from the
property.6 5 In an Illinois case 68 the power to determine the amount of
income to be paid out of the trust was vested in a trustee who was a
close relative of the settlor. The court found that this in effect
amounted to the retention of the economic benefit from the property
for the transferor's life and held the transfer taxable at his death under
the "transfer intended" clause.
62201 Wis. 636, 231 N.W. 271 (1930).
6385 C.J.S., TAxation §1147(3) (c). See cases cited in footnote 10 at page 934.
64217 Wis. 491, 259 N.W. 433 (1935).
65 Supra, note 22. Koch v. McCutcheon, 111 N.J. L. 154, 167 AtI. 752 (1933).
66 People v. Moses, 363 Il1. 423, 2 N.E.2d 724 (1936).
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Not only may the retention of a present economic benefit result
in taxability under the clause but the retention of a possible economic
benefit in the future from the property may also have the same effect.
How a transferor may inadvertently retain such a benefit was force-
fully illustrated in the Spiegel case," where a reversionary interest was
retained by the settlor because the trust agreement failed to provide
for a gift over in the event that the settlor survived the beneficiaries.
Whether the existence of this reversionary interest in the transferor is
sufficient in itself to bring the transfer within the reach of the "trans-
fer intended" clause is a question on which there is no Wisconsin
case and in other jurisdictions the cases are in conflict.6" These cases
illustrate the necessity of providing a gift over in a trust agreement
to prevent a reversion from arising out of the possibility that the settlor
may survive his beneficiaries even though the contingency is extremely
improbable and may in fact never occur.
III. INTER Vivos TRANSFERS WHERE THE TRANSFEROR RETAINS
THE RIGHT, EITHER ALONE OR IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANY
PERSON, To ALTER, AMEND, REVOKE OR TERMINATE SUCH
TRANSFER, OR TO DESIGNATE THE BENEFICIARY
The Wisconsin legislature in passing the 1949 amendments to the
"transfer intended" provision69 and the complementary gift tax7" pro-
vision apparently intended to set up two broad tests for determining
taxability of an inter vivos transfer. Various aspects of the "retention
of beneficial interest" test were discussed in Part II of this paper.
The second test or the "retention of control" test shall now be con-
sidered. Prior to the 1949 amendments the Wisconsin court in con-
struing and applying the "transfer intended" clause recognized that
the retention by the transferor of a right to dispose of the beneficial
interest in the property might be equivalent to the actual retention of
a beneficial interest in the transferor for his lifetime.7 Under this
67 Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701, 69 S.Ct. 301, 93 L.Ed. 330 (1949). This
decision was instrumental in bringing about the Technical Changes Act of
1949 which redefined the "transfer intended" clause for federal estate tax
purposes.
68 See cases collected in 85 C.J.S., TAXATION, §1149(3) (d), footnote 39 at page
937-8. People v. McCormick, 327 Ill. 547, 158 N.E. 861 (1927), Estate of Dun-
lap, 205 App.Div. 125, 199 N.Y. Supp. 147 (1923), Boston Safe Deposit and
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 267 Mass. 240, 166 N.E. 729 (1929).
69 Supra, note 11.
70 Supra, note 17.
71 In the Estate of Prange, 201 Wis. 636, 231 N.W. 271 (1930), the court dealt
with a trust agreement under the terms of which the settlor retained the right
to vote the stock in a closely held corporation. About two and a half years
before his death the decedent transferred the controlling shares of stock to a
corporate trustee to be held in trust for a period of thirty years with the
power to distribute the income annually during the thirty year period and at
the termination to distribute the corpus to the five children of the settlor or
their issue. The right to vote the controlling shares of stock was to vest in the
beneficiaries of the trust at the death of the settlor. The court held that the
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judicial test it was required that there be an increase in value of the
property transfered when the right to dispose of the beneficial interest
was terminated by the transferor's death. Under the statutory test
prescribed by the 1949 amendment, it appears that it is no longer
necessary that there be an increase in value of the property in the
hands of the transferee as a result of the termination of the right of
control at the death of the transferor.7 2
If the "retention of control" test is satisfied, the transfer comes
under the "transfer intended" clause irrespective of when the shift
of the beneficial interest occurs, unless the transferor's right of control
terminates within his lifetime. Where the right of control terminates
within the transferor's lifetime, the controlling factor becomes the
time at which the shifting of the beneficial interest occurs. In the
run-of-the-mill fact situation the rights of control retained are not
qualified by any time limitation. The death of the transferor is a
factor in the devolution of the property in such cases because the right
or the "string attached" is cut off by his death. The critical point in
such cases is not the timing element, but the extent or the degree of
control over the property retained by the transferor. Whenever the
courts are confronted with questions of degree, the decisions are in-
variably marked by sharp conflicts. 73 In order to resolve to some extent
the conflict existing among the courts, the 1949 amendment to Sec.
72.01(3) expressly included transfers where the control retained
consists of the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person,
to alter, amend, revoke or terminate the transfer, or to designate the
beneficary of the transfer.
1. Inter Vivos Trusts. The "transfer intended" clause has been
effectively used by the courts in attacking the inter vivos trust, which
is well adapted to schemes of tax avoidance.74 Because of this possi-
bility the clause is expressly applicable to transfers "in trust or other-
mere reservation of the right to vote the controlling stock did not amount to
the retention of an economic benefit that would pass to the beneficiaries at the
death of the transferor.
7 2 
WIS. STATS. (1955) §72.01(3) (b).
73 See annotation in 155 A.L.R. 850 (1945). The mere right to revoke trust does
not render an estate subject to tax. Masury's Estate, 28 App.Div. 580, 51 N.Y.
Supp. 331 (1898), aff'd 159 N.Y. 532, 53 N.E. 1127 (1899). Contra, Cochran v.
McLaughlin, 129 Conn. 176, 27 A.2d 120 (1942). Where power is reserved not
to settlor alone but is to be exercised by him in conjunction with another per-
son, it was held that if interest of the other person was sufficiently adverse,
the transfer was not subject to the succession tax because "any person" in the
New York statute means any person not having a substantial adverse interest.
See in matter of Stewart's Estate, 138 Misc. 866, 248 N.Y. Supp. (1931), aff'd
235 App.Div. 772, 255 N.Y. Supp. 970 (1932).
74 The decided cases under the "transfer intended" clause involve predominantly
inter vivos trusts. How the various courts have used the clause in attacking the
inter vivos trust with conflicting results is set forth in an interesting comment
in 79 UNiv. PA. L. Rxv. 185 (1930).
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wise."' 7 - While the courts will agree that where a settlor retains a
beneficial interest in the form of income for his lifetime such a trans-
fer falls within the scope of the clause 7 6 the courts are not as willing
to agree on the issue of taxability where the settlor parts with the
economic benefits of the property but retains the right to control the
disposition of these benefits.
7
7
A failure on the part of some courts to distinguish between the
three basic trust arrangements that come within the purview of the
clause has resulted in a maze of decisions.78 These three distinguish-
able basic arrangements are:
(1) Under the terms of the trust agreement the settlor retains all or
part of the economic benefits from the property for his lifetime
with or without any rights of control over the property,
(2) Under the terms of the trust agreement the settlor parts with all
the economic benefits from the property but retains the requisite
degrees of control over the property, and
(3) Under the terms of the trust agreement the settlor retains neither
any economic benefits from the property nor any control but his
death is a factor in the devolution of the corpus of the trust.
Arrangement number (1) is nothing more than the equivalent of a
reservation of a life estate with a remainder over to certain benefi-
aries. The presence or absence of any right of control does not affect
the taxability under the "transfer intended" clause.78  Arrangement
(2) involves the "retention of control" test. What rights retained
place the transfer within the purview of the clause are specified in
part in Sec. 72.01(3) (b). Arrangement number (3) is the equivalent
of the transfer of a life estate measured by the life of the transferor
with a remainder over to other beneficiaries. This situation arises
when the trust agreement provides for the termination of the trust
at the death of the settlor and for a distribution of the corpus at
such time. 0 The fact that the settlor has not retained any control or
75 WIS. STATS. (1955) §72.01.
76Sitpra, note 74.
77 Estate of Bullen, 143 Wis. 512, 128 N.W. 109 (1910).
78Topping v. McLaughiln, 125 Conn. 456, 6 A.2d 343 (1939), contra, People v.
Armiger, 372 II1. 415, 24 N.E.2d 355 (1939). Other cases are extensively an-
notated in 155 A.L.R. 850 (1945).
79 If the "retention of beneficial interest" test under Sec. 72.01(3) (b) is satisfied,
the transfer is caught under the "transfer intended" clause and is taxable. No
further analysis under the "retention of control" test is necessary.
80 Fabian v. Walsh, 134 Conn. 456, 58 A.2d 384 (1948). The settlor reserved no
interest or control in the trust but it was to terminate upon the decease of the
survivor of the settlor and her husband and upon termination of the trust the
corpus of the trust was to be distributed to a daughter. The husband pre-
deceased the settlor. The court held the transfer taxable under the "transfer
intended" clause because the death of the settlor was a necessary factor to
effectuate the transfer to the daughter. See Matter of Crnger, 54 App.Div. 403,
66 N.Y.Supp. 636 (1900), aff'd 166 N.Y. 602, 59 N.E. 1121 (1901), where the
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beneficial interest in the property should exclude it from taxability
under the clause.81
2. Death Benefits Under Profit Sharing and Pension Trust
Plans. In recent years a number of the state courts have been
confronted with the problem of determining whether the death benefits
under federal retirement system, private profit-sharing and pension
trust plans, and individual annuity contracts are taxable under the
"transfer intended" clause. These decisions are characterized by their
sharp conflicts.8
2
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in a recent 4-3 decision 3 ruled
that the death benefits payable to a widow under the Federal Civil
Service Retirement Act8 4 were not taxable under the "transfer in-
tended" clause. Under the federal retirement plan the beneficiaries
are prescribed by law and the employee has no right to change the
beneficiary. Both the government and the employee contributed to
the plan. The widow under the plan was entitled to an annuity of
$185.00 per month for life, the annuity having a present value of
18,907.96 based on the life expectancy of the widow.
The majority opinion relied upon several New York decisions
involving life insurance contracts payable to specific beneficiaries and
holding that such insurance payments upon death are immune to the
succession tax because they do not pass into the estate of the insured
and are not therefore subject to the Inheritance Tax Act. It also cited
with approval the reason given in the New York cases that insurance
benefits payable to the dependents of the insured are charged with a
fact that the settlor's death determined the time of distribution was held to
render the transfer taxable when the remainderman was not the beneficiary
of the income during the settlor's lifetime. In view of the Wisconsin rule of
statutory construction that where a statute has received a judicial construction
in another state and such statute is then adopted in Wisconsin, it is taken with
the construction -which has been so given to it. Estate of Sweet, 270 Wis. 256,
70 N.W.2d 646 (1955), it may be contended that the above New York decision
is a part of Wisconsin law.
This problem may also have been involved in Will of Fehlhaber, 272 Wis. 327,
75 N.W.2d 444 (1956), when the deceased delivered prior to her death promis-
sory notes and U.S. Government bonds to her son and instructed him to share
them equally with his sister at the time of her death. The decision does not
disclose who retained the beneficial interest in the property from the time of
delivery to the time of her death. The court held without discussion that the
transfer came within the purview of Sec. 72.01(3) (b).
81 This question has not been judicially answered in Wisconsin. In view of the
dual test provided in Sec. 72.01(3) (b), unless either one of these tests are
met, the transfer should be excluded.
82 In re Dorsey's Estate, 336 Pa. 557, 79 A.2d 259 (1951), In re Daniels, 93 Ohio
App. 123, 112 N.E.2d 56 (1953), Garos v. State Tax Commission, 109 A.2d
844 (1954), Borchard v. Connelly, 140 Conn. 491, 101 A.2d 497 (1953).
83 Estate of Sweet, 270 Wis. 256, 70 N.W. 2d 646 (1955).
84 After the Sweet case was handed down, the Wisconsin legislature enacted
Chapter 589, Laws of 1955 creating Sec. 72.04(6) which now exempts from the




public interest and unless the legislature clearly expresses an intention
to tax such benefits the court would not do so as a matter of policy.
In the dissenting opinion Justice Currie points out that the requirement
that some interest pass under the laws of inheritance was expressly
rejected in an earlier Wisconsin decision and is inconsistent with the
express language of Sec. 72.01(3)(b). The dissent also indicates that
the absence of any right in the decedent during his life to name or
change the beneficiary is not a decisive factor where the decedent
retained a beneficial interest in the pension fund during his lifetime
and where this beneficial interest shifts to a beneficiary specified by
law. 5 The beneficial interest which the decedent retained for his life-
time was in the nature of an annuity payable to him upon retirement,
the amount of which was determined by his own and the govern-
ment's contributions to the fund. His death is a factor in the devolution
of this interest from him to the specified beneficiary. The position
taken by the dissenting justices appears to be more consistent with the
principles evolved in the earlier Wisconsin cases.
3. Savings and Loan Association and State Bank Trust Ac-
counts. A recent California decision86 highlights another current
problem concerning the taxability under the "transfer intended"
clause of trust accounts in a savings and loan association. In this
case the decedent deposited a fund in trust for his adult son. The
court, in holding the fund taxable had absolute control of the trust
account.
Trust accounts, similar to the one involved in the California deci-
sion, are authorized under Sec. 215.18 and 221.44 for Wisconsin
savings and loan associations and state banks. These sections provide
that in the absence of notice of the existence and terms of any valid
trust, the deposit may be paid to the designated beneficiary in the
event of the death of the trustee.
Under Wisconsin law the trustee has the absolute control over
the trust account during his life. The beneficiary has no right to the
account until the death of the trustee. Thus, the trustee who had
deposited the fund retains the beneficial interest in the fund for his
lifetime, and the beneficiary has no right to the possession and enjoy-
ment of the fund until the death of the trustee. The payment of the
account to the beneficiary after the death of the trustee, therefore,
should be taxable under the "transfer intended" clause.
IV. AN ADEQUATE AND FULL CONSIDERATION IN MONEY OR
MONEY'S WORTH - THE MONEY EQUIVALENT
It was not until 19498 that there was any statutory provision in
s Supra, note 77.
s Estate of Goldfader, 280 P.2d 799 (1955).
s7 Chapter 172 of the Laws of 1949.
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Wisconsin excepting from taxation under the clause transfers for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth. Prior
to this time such exception was granted by judicial decision 8 on the
ground that where the transferor has received consideration for the
property transferred, no interest passes by inheritance. The money
equivalent requirement has been a prolific source of litigation in the
federal courts and in some of the states. 89 In the federal courts the
decisions have run the gamut of all the technical niceties of the common
law concepts of consideration. The relinquishment of certain rights
may be sufficient if the money equivalent requirement is satisfied. The'
relinquishment of marital rights is not generally considered a money
equivalent. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Will of Koeffler 0
held in 1935 that a transfer of* property at the death of the transferor
pursuant to an ante-nuptial agreement was for an adequate considera-
tion. The court intimated that "if our statute contained a provision to
the effect that all property of the decedent, except such as might be
due upon a contract consideration for money or money's worth, was
subject to taxation, we should probably be obliged to reach a different
result as the courts of Massachusetts and New York have done." In view
of the fact that the Wisconsin statute now contains the money equiva-
lent limitation and that by statutory amendment in 1953, the words
"the intestate laws of this state" include rights acquired by contract
in lieu of dower, transfers at death pursuant to an ante-nuptial agree-
ment would now be subject to inheritance taxation under Sec. 72.01
(3) (b) and 72.01(1).
The decisive point under the money equivalent limitation appears
to be whether or not the payment made to the transferor for the
property equals the economic value of the property. There have been
no decisions in Wisconsin construing the money equivalent limitation,
but the corresponding Massachusetts statute is construed to require
that the consideration passing from the beneficiary be at least equal
in value to the property received. 91 The burden of proof in such a
case is on the party affirmatively asserting that the consideration is
in money or money's worth. However, if the party proves only a
partial consideration, there is no exemption provided for the partial
amount.
V. CONCLUSION
An understanding of the full scope of the "transfer intended"
clause becomes important to the attorney engaged in estate planning
and to the attorney probating an estate. In view of Sec. 72.75(4)
s8 Will of Koeffler, 218 Wis. 560, 260 N.W. 638 (1935).
S9 157 A.L.R. 964 (1945).
90 218 Wis. 560, 260 N.W. 638 (1935).
91 State Street Trust Co. v. Stevens, 209 Mass. 373, 95 N.E. 851 (1911).
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which provides that no gift tax will be imposed upon the transfer of
any property which is taxable under the inheritance tax law of this
state, inter vivos gifts falling within the scope of the "transfer in-
tended" clause are not subject to the Wisconsin gift tax but the pay-
ment of a gift tax cannot be considered complete protection against the
later imposition of the inheritance tax. The 1953 amendment to Sec.
312.01 has provided the public administrator with a tool that may aid
him in the enforcement of the "transfer intended" clause. The section
now expressly imposes a duty upon the personal representative to
file in his inventory for tax purposes all gifts taking effect at death
which come to his possession or knowledge. If the personal repre-
sentative petitions the court for instructions or if he goes ahead and
includes a questionable transfer in the estate inventory, the public
administrator and the interested donee are afforded an opportunity to
contest the issue of taxability at the outset of the administration.
HENRY J. MARCINIAK
